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ASSESSING RULE-BASED GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
IN AN ERA OF SCIENTISM
 
MAKI HATANAKA
SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY
  
ABSTRACT
With neoliberal reforms and economic globalization, much of the regulation of food and agriculture is
shifting from the state to the private sphere. Building on Busch’s work on science, the state, and the market,
this paper examines the ways in which the governance of food and agriculture has become increasingly
scientized with the use of third-party certification (TPC). TPC is a rule-based governance mechanism that
consists of technical rules and procedures, which are based on scientific norms and practices. Using longitudinal
research on an organic shrimp project in Indonesia, this paper examines the practices of TPC. Specifically, the
focus is on the extent to which the practices of TPC correspond to its rules and thus, whether or not politics
and interests are removed from governance. My findings indicate that the rules of TPC are not sufficient for
the removal of politics and interests. Rather, they often push them backstage. In concluding, I contend that
forms of rule-based scientific governance, such as TPC, separate the governance of food and agriculture from
their production and consumption. The outcome is potentially a political, yet undemocratic, form of food and
agricultural governance where science functions to mask politics.
In The Eclipse of Morality, Busch (2000) argued that society has become
increasingly ordered and dominated by three Leviathans: science, the state, and the
market. Using the foundational works of Bacon, Hobbes, and Smith, he suggested
that underlying the establishment of each of these institutions was the belief that
individuals could not maintain order in society and thus, an extra-human force –
science, the state, or the market – was necessary. Busch contended that these
largely undemocratic institutions have had mixed results for society. On the one
hand, there have been tremendous increases in knowledge and technology,
significant expansion of global wealth, and improvements in social welfare. On the
other hand, science has often benefitted special interests and not the public good.
Rising income inequality globally indicates that capitalist markets often benefit a
small elite at the expense of the great majority, and states often do not represent all
of their constituents equally. 
In contemporary society, the three Leviathans have coalesced in a historically
unique manner with the emergence of current forms of governance. With neoliberal
reforms and economic globalization, much of the regulation is now shifting from the
state to the private sphere, that is, from government to governance (Busch 2010;
Hatanaka and Busch 2008; Higgins and Lawrence 2005; Jessop 2002; Marsden et
al. 2010; Stoker 1998; Swyngedouw, Page, and Kaika 2002). This means that,
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whereas the state used to establish and enforce laws regulating all sorts of practices,
processes, and products, now non-state-centered governance approaches are
increasingly used to develop standards to regulate nearly all aspects of society. The
outcome is that, today, there is a proliferation of governance mechanisms
characterized by “neo-corporatist regulatory frameworks involving non-binding
standards and rules, public-private co-operation, self-regulation” (McCarthy and
Prudham 2004:276). In such a framework, regulations are often market driven,
standards development and enforcement are science based, and regulatory
responsibility is shared between multiple actors (Cashore 2002; Loconto and Busch
2010). 
Building on Busch’s work on science, the state, and the market, this paper
examines the ways in which the governance of food and agriculture has been
increasingly transferred to one of the three Leviathans: science (Tanaka 2005). To
date, the leading form that non-state governance has tended to take in food and
agriculture is third-party certification (TPC) (Blowfield 1999; Hatanaka, Bain, and
Busch 2005; Murray and Raynolds 2000; Mutersbaugh et al. 2005; Renard 2003).
In brief, TPC is a governance mechanism whereby independent bodies oversee the
implementation of standards, typically by using audits. TPC is often understood as
a science-based governance mechanism, as it consists of technical rules and
procedures, which are based on scientific norms and practices, such as
disinterestedness, replicability, and validity (Dunn 2005; Konefal and Hatanaka
Forthcoming; O'Rourke 2006; Power 1997; Tanner 2000). These rules and
procedures are designed to prevent undue influence, unsupported arguments, and
corrupt practices, and in doing so, remove politics and interests from the practices
of TPC. 
Using longitudinal research on an organic shrimp project in Indonesia, this
paper examines the rules and practices of TPC. Specifically, the focus is on the
standards-development and conformity-assessment processes and whether the rules
function to make TPC a scientific and objective governance mechanism. My
findings contest such an understanding of TPC. Rather, they indicate that rule-
based forms of governance, such as TPC, are unable to remove politics and interests
from governance. Instead, I argue that such forms of governance often push politics
and interests backstage.
Data on the organic shrimp project were gathered using extensive field research
in 2004 and 2008. In total, 118 interviews were conducted with a variety of actors
involved in shrimp farming in the region, including certified and non-certified
shrimp farmers, certified and non-certified warehouse owners, project managers and
2
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organizers, hatchery owners, social movement organizations (SMOs), national and
regional government officials, and aquaculture specialists. In 2004, data were
collected on the origins of the organic shrimp project, views on certification, the
potential implications of the project, and the relationship among different actors
associated with the project. During follow-up research in 2008, key informants were
re-interviewed to assess the ways in which the implementation of the project had
progressed and changes in understanding of the project by various constituents.
Both sets of interview data were also supplemented by participant observation
whenever possible, which focused on the interactions among actors in the project.
Lastly, content analysis of archival data on shrimp aquaculture and TPC from
websites, newsletters, and reports by transnational organizations, such as the Food
and Agriculture Organization, national and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and certification bodies was conducted.  1
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. First, I review the
factors that lead to TPC being understood as a science-based governance
mechanism. Specifically, how TPC is constructed on the notion of mechanical
objectivity is examined. Second, I provide a brief overview of the organic shrimp
project in Indonesia. Third, I examine whether the practices of TPC correspond to
the rules of TPC. Specifically, the focus is on: (1) the use of expert knowledge in the
standards-development process, (2) the independence of audits, and (3) the
effectiveness of the conformity-assessment process. In concluding, I discuss the
potential implications of transferring moral responsibility for food and agriculture
from farmers and consumers to experts. In particular, I examine how TPC separates
the governance of food and agriculture from those who produce and consume them.
I argue that the outcome of such a separation may be a political, yet undemocratic,
form of food and agricultural governance, where the use of science masks politics
and interests. 
GOVERNANCE AND SCIENCE
With the House of Salomon, Bacon ([1605/1626] 1974) proposed a society
“based on what we now call the natural sciences, in which use of the proper methods
would ensure the emergence of truth” (Busch 2000:3). For Bacon, a rule-based
system of governance in which experts made decisions would result in a more
ordered, efficient, and just society than democratic politics (Busch 1999). In short,
To maintain confidentiality, the identities of the companies involved in the organic shrimp1
project, as well as the project location, have been changed.
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technocracy had to supplant politics. While Bacon’s vision of a science-based society
has never been fully enacted, his idea of scientific governance has been highly
influential in many industries, including food and agriculture (Jasanoff 1990;
Tanaka 2005). For example, genetically-modified organisms are evaluated using a
science-based framework in the United States, what counts as safe food is a
scientific question, and even the notion of sustainability is scientifically decided
(Hatanaka, Konefal, and Constance Forthcoming; Konefal and Busch 2010; Newell
2007). Furthermore, for regulations to be legitimate, the prevailing view is that
they should be objective and based on science.
With the shift from government toward governance, science has become even
more prominent in the regulation of food and agriculture (Marsden et al. 2010). In
part, this is because whereas the political authority of the state functions to
legitimate government regulations, private regulatory bodies must turn to other
sources for legitimization. Primarily, such bodies have turned to science (i.e., the
notions of objectivity and expertise) to legitimize their standards and enforcement
mechanisms (see International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 2011;
Marine Stewardship Council 2010; National Science Foundation International
2010). Thus, among other things, the shift toward governance has entailed the
proliferation of expert and rules-based governance in food and agriculture. Put
differently, the contemporary governance of food and agriculture is, at least, a
partial manifestation of Bacon’s argument in that technocracy is seemingly
supplanting politics. 
Generally, two processes characterize the governance of food and agriculture
today: standards development and conformity assessment. Both processes are often
part of TPC.  In the standards-development process, product or process standards2
are developed for a particular industry, product, or quality (e.g., safety,
sustainability, organic, and fair-trade). The entity that undertakes this process
varies, as it can be a single body, multiple bodies, or a collection of stakeholders
(Hatanaka et al. 2005). Additionally, the standards-development process is often
governed by rules, which, for example, stipulate criteria for participation, decision-
making procedures, and supporting documentation requirements. Ideally, the
standards-development process is structured in ways that seek to maximize
stakeholder participation, balance interests, and require that positions be supported
While this continues to be the case sometimes, increasingly they are separated, with different2
organizations undertaking standards development and overseeing conformity assessment. 
4
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 25 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol25/iss3/8
ASSESSING RULE-BASED GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 145
by scientific evidence (Hatanaka et al. Forthcoming). Increasingly, the purported
outcome is standards that are developed using inclusive and objective processes and
are based on scientific evidence (Loconto and Busch 2010). 
In the conformity-assessment process, independent and objective bodies (i.e.,
third-party certifiers) ensure the implementation of standards. Generally, third-
party certifiers use audits to ensure standards compliance, as audits are considered
as technical and objective conformity-assessment mechanism (Power 1997). Several
qualities of audits are responsible for this understanding of them. First, those who
conduct the audit are independent of those being audited. Second, to audit
something, it needs to be capable of being measured; thus, audits are based on
tangible evidence, which most is often technical in character. Third, that which is
being audited must be clearly identifiable. That is, what is being audited must be
objective in the sense that it is (at least in principle) independently verifiable (Power
1997). In short, audits represent compliance with impersonal rules and calculations
that function to exclude bias and personal preferences (Courville, Parker, and
Watchirs 2003; Pentland 2000).
Given the complex set of rules and procedures of the standards-development
and conformity-assessment processes, TPC is congruent with Porter’s (1995)
notion of “mechanical objectivity.” Simply stated, mechanical objectivity means
“following the rules.” According to Porter (1995:4), “rules are a check on
subjectivity” in that they eliminate personal bias and preferences. From this
perspective, TPC is objective because it has a complex set of rules and procedures
designed to exclude biases from both standards development and conformity
assessment. The purported outcome is standards that are based on sound science
and not ideological positions, and a conformity-assessment mechanism that
generates results that are objective, measurable, and replicable. 
In the sections below, using a case study of an organic shrimp project in
Indonesia, I examine the extent to which the practices of TPC correspond with its
rules. Put differently, whether or not the standards-development and conformity-
assessment processes indeed adhere to the rules in practice and thus, remove politics
and interests from governance is analyzed.
THE ORGANIC SHRIMP PROJECT IN BOJOKULU, INDONESIA 
The organic shrimp project was located on the eastern coast of the island of
Java, Bojokulu. Bojokulu is an area that has long been nationally known as a
milkfish and shrimp farming site. Farmers in Bojokulu have used extensive
aquaculture practices for more than 300 years. However, similar to other
5
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Indonesian shrimp pond communities, with the advent of Blue Revolution
technologies, the Bojokulu Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries began to
push intensive shrimp farming through extension services in the late 1980s.
Consequently, those local shrimp pond owners who could afford to implement
intensive farming practices have largely switched to such practices. 
Similar to other shrimp production sites throughout the world, while the
quantity of shrimp produced has increased, a myriad of problems have also
accompanied the intensification of shrimp farming in the region. These include the
use of excessive chemical inputs, destruction of mangrove forests, loss of genetic
diversity in shrimp populations, and uneven income distribution (Barbier 2003;
Environmental Justice Foundation 2003; Goss, Burch, and Rickson 2000; Lebel et
al. 2002; Quarto, Cissna, and Taylor 1996; Skladany and Harris 1995; Stonich and
Bailey 2000).
It is against this backdrop that a few sustainable shrimp farmers in Bojokulu and
a Japanese NGO, Sustainable Network, collaboratively developed an ecological
shrimp project in 1992. Seeking to promote environmental sustainability and social
justice, the project’s aim was to preserve traditional shrimp farming practices in
Bojokulu through linking shrimp farmers who use extensive practices with
concerned co-op consumers in Japan. In the late 1990s, several potential European
buyers, who were interested in sustainable shrimp, approached Sustainable
Network. The European buyers were interested in purchasing shrimp from the
project, but preferred the shrimp to be third-party certified. From their perspective,
TPC was a more reliable regulatory mechanism than self-assessment by suppliers.
Thus, TPC would provide greater guarantees to them and consumers that the
shrimp were, in fact, produced sustainably. 
Soon thereafter, Sustainable Network convened an open forum in Bojokulu to
discuss the possibility of an organic shrimp project with the farming community.
Local shrimp warehouse owners, pond owners, NGOs, and government officials
were all invited. More than 100 people attended the meeting, and the overwhelming
majority voiced enthusiasm for an organic project. With the support of the local
pond community, Sustainable Network and a group of shrimp farmers, who were
part of the original ecological project, applied for organic shrimp certification from
a well-established third-party certifier in Europe, Green Soil, in 2001. 
In establishing the organic project, Green Soil asked Sustainable Network to
take an active role. This included being involved in the establishment of standards
(this is discussed below) and setting up the internal control system (ICS). An ICS
is an audit-based monitoring system designed to ensure compliance with the
6
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standards at production sites. An independent organization, Perlindungan Alam
(PA) was established to manage the ICS. While some farmers who were
knowledgeable about “sustainable shrimp farming” were consultants to PA, to
ensure the organization’s independence, staff members of PA could not be involved
in any part of the shrimp supply chain. 
Organic certification was issued in July 2002. The organic standards included
a requirement of documentation, no chemical inputs, the planting of mangrove trees
around the ponds and their dikes (with maximum seven-meter distance between
trees), specified stock density (maximum: three seedlings/m²), and the use of
polyculture with milkfish (ideally 50/50). To entice local farmers to join the project,
a high base price was paid to producers and warehouses. Additionally, a one USD
premium was paid for each kilogram of organic shrimp, which was divided between
warehouses and shrimp farmers. The Bojokulu area has approximately 15,000
hectares (ha) of shrimp ponds, among which approximately 2,500 ha were certified
organic by Green Soil. Organic pond sizes ranged from small to quite large, as there
were no restrictions on pond size to join the organic project. The only membership
requirements were that pond owners had a legal title to the land and that it was
legally cleared. 
As of November 2004, the organic shrimp project included: 3 organic
warehouses, 120 pond owners, and 224 pond managers. The size of the project has
fluctuated over the six years during which Green Soil certified the project as
organic.  On average, 800 tons of organic shrimp were produced annually.  In May3 4
2008, Sustainable Network and PA decided not to renew their organic certification
due to internal conflicts. As a result, the organic certification was terminated.
ANALYSIS: RULES VS. PRACTICES OF THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION
The organic shrimp project in Bojokulu had the appearance of a stable project
over the six years it was in existence. Organic certification was first issued in July
2002 and certification was continuously reissued by Green Soil based on its annual
audits until May 2008 when Sustainable Network and PA decided not to extend
This is largely because the European buyer ceased to purchase the shrimp due to a campaign3
by an environmental organization that targeted Green Soil’s organic standards as insufficient. For
a more detailed discussion, see Hatanaka (2010b).
While the shrimp were certified organic by Green Soil, the shrimp were sold to Japanese co-op4
consumers as “ecological shrimp” after the European buyer stopped purchasing them. Partly, this
is because Japanese co-op consumers valued second-party certification (i.e., certification conducted
by themselves) more highly than TPC. 
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their application. According to Green Soil, having its organic certification indicates
that, first, stringent and systematic organic standards are in place. Second, there is
an impartial and expert oversight mechanism with clearly defined procedures that
ensure compliance with the standards. Additionally, Green Soil highlights that its
certification scheme is accredited by the International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). Such accreditation indicates that its standards-
development and conformity-assessment processes are reliable and credible.  As the5
member farmers were passing both periodic audits by PA and annual audits by
Green Soil, the project was fulfilling its objective of environmentally sustainable
shrimp farming. 
However, a different understanding of the organic shrimp project emerges when
the actual workings of the project are examined. Specifically, the understanding that
Green Soil’s standards-development and conformity-assessment processes were
based on expert knowledge and impartial rules and procedures (i.e., built on
“mechanical objectivity”) is contested. Rather, one finds that considerable politics
and interests characterize the actual workings of TPC. In the following empirical
sections, expert knowledge in the standards-development process, the impartiality
of audits, and the ability of the conformity-assessment process to enforce standards
are examined. 
Expert Knowledge and Standards Development 
As discussed above, the use of experts, along with the need for standards to be
grounded in scientific knowledge, is a key characteristic of the standards-
development process. Additionally, as the use of TPC has proliferated and spread
globally, the need to allow for local specificities in standards has become
increasingly recognized. Committed to these two positions, Green Soil used the
following procedure in developing standards for the organic project: first, it shared
the core principles of its organic standards with Sustainable Network and interested
shrimp farmers; second, it proposed that Sustainable Network and interested shrimp
farmers develop locally-appropriate organic standards based on Green Soil’s core
principles; and third, Green Soil would review and approve the standards. In this
way, the organic standards would be based on expert knowledge on organic farming
and also incorporate local knowledge on shrimp farming in Bojokulu. 
This information comes from Green Soil documents. Specific documents are not cited as this5
would reveal the identity of Green Soil.
8
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As Sustainable Network believed that farmers understood shrimp farming best,
they let them take the lead in developing the standards. A committee was then
formed to develop the organic standards. The committee included an aquaculture
specialist and four shrimp farmers who were members of the original ecological
shrimp project. Although the committee and Green Soil jointly developed agreed
upon standards for the organic project, generally, committee members felt that
whenever a disagreement emerged, Green Soil’s position was prioritized. Thus,
committee members tended to feel that their local knowledge was often
marginalized in the standards-development process.6
When the standards were introduced to potential member farmers, their
reaction toward the organic standards was quite varied. Some agreed with the
standards (or parts of them) while others disagreed with the standards (or parts of
them). However, regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with the standards,
a common response by many farmers was confusion, and even upset feelings.
Particularly troubling for many farmers was the requirement to plant mangrove
trees around their ponds and dikes. In part, this is because this requirement
conflicted with what experts had been telling them for quite sometime. With the
push by the Indonesian government to adopt Blue Revolution technologies, shrimp
farmers in Bojokulu had been educated and trained to believe that mangrove trees
negatively affected shrimp farming. For example, they had been instructed by
extension officials to remove all the mangrove trees to help maximize productivity. 
In contrast to the information they had been receiving from extension officials
since the late 1980s, the organic standards required farmers to replant mangrove
trees. More generally, member farmers were now being instructed by project
leaders that intensive farming was not the best way to farm shrimp. Rather, they
were informed that some experts have found that intensive shrimp farming
practices are responsible for significant environmental problems, and mangrove
trees are actually a vital component of shrimp pond ecology. 
Hence, in the case of the organic shrimp project in Bojokulu, there were two
conflicting sets of expert knowledge. The first was expert knowledge that supports
intensive shrimp farming. The second was expert knowledge that supports
“sustainable” farming practices. On the one hand, proponents of intensive
aquaculture have emphasized, and continue to emphasize, the benefits of Blue
Revolution technologies. Consequently, they continue to argue that mangrove trees
need to be cleared to maximize productivity. On the other hand, as the negative
For more detailed discussion of this process, see Hatanaka 2010a.6
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impacts of the Blue Revolution have become increasingly documented, a counter-
knowledge has emerged that argues that many intensive practices are problematic.
Thus, there were competing expert knowledges for shrimp farming. The result was
that farmers were receiving conflicting information on the best ways to farm
shrimp, which left many of them quite confused. For example, one farmer
commented, “one day we are told to cut mangrove trees as the best farming
practice; and the other day we are told to plant mangrove trees. Give me a break.
What do you expect us to do?” 
The above findings indicate that the requirement that standards be based on
expert knowledge does not make the standards-development process apolitical. As
the case of the organic shrimp project illustrates, there can be multiple forms of
expert knowledge, which may be conflicting. Thus, depending on which expert
knowledge is used, what are considered to be appropriate standards may differ. This
means that delineating what counts as expert knowledge and which expert
knowledge is valid are crucial components of the standards-development process.
As my case demonstrates, such decisions are not just scientific, but are also political
and ethical. 
Independence and Audits
The organic shrimp project entailed two sets of audits. One set of audits was
external, conducted by Green Soil. Annually, a team of auditors from Green Soil
visited Bojokulu and checked member farmers and PA documents, as well as
conducting random pond visits and interviews with member farmers. The second
set of audits was internal, and was conducted by PA. Since external auditors were
only at the production site for a limited time, PA oversaw compliance with the
standards regularly. This was done through audits and periodically announced and
unannounced inspections of all member ponds. 
As discussed above, a key component of the conformity-assessment process is
the independence of auditors from supply chain actors.  In both sets of audits,7
measures were taken to ensure that auditors were organizationally independent
from the supply chain. Green Soil is an independent third-party certifier with no
direct interest in shrimp farming. Auditors for PA could not be involved in any
For example, one of the ISO/IEC Guide 65 requirements states that a certification body, with7
its senior executive and staff, must be free from any commercial, financial, and other pressures that
might influence the results of the certification process.
10
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aspect of shrimp farming. Thus, in both instances, the conformity-assessment
process exhibited organizational independence.
While the conformity-assessment process of the organic shrimp project was
characterized by organizational independence, my findings indicate that it did not
exhibit operational independence. Operational independence refers to the extent to
which auditors exhibit independence in their actual practices. Hence, to assess the
independence of auditors, both the structure and practices of the conformity-
assessment process need to be examined (Hatanaka and Busch 2008). My findings
show that neither PA nor Green Soil were fully independent in their practices. In
the case of PA the lack of operational independence was straightforward. Most
notably, some of PA’s inspectors accepted bribes from farmers to accept non-
organic shrimp as organic. This included both member farmers who were not fully
compliant with the standards and non-member farmers who wanted to sell their
shrimp as organic. Such practices indicate that the structure and organizational
independence of PA were insufficient to prevent and, in most, detect fraud by some
of its inspectors. 
In the case of Green Soil, the ways in which audits were not always impartial
were more complex. During my first field visit in 2004, a concern expressed by PA
officials was that Green Soil was pushing its version of environmental sustainability
too fast. In interviews, PA officials indicated that they thought Green Soil’s time
line for transitioning to full compliance with the organic standards was not feasible
given the lack of necessary infrastructure, financial constraints, and generally lower
educational levels of member farmers.  For example, a particularly contentious issue8
was the timeframe for member farmers to conform to the standards for mangrove
reforestation. The standard stated that member farmers must plant a minimum of
50 percent of the required trees in the first year, 80 percent in the second year, and
100 percent by the end of third year.  PA officials predicted that the number of9
shrimp farmers who were part of the organic project would significantly decline in
the future as many member farmers would not meet the reforestation requirements.
From their perspective, educating the member farmers as to the importance of the
reforestation and changing their understanding of mangrove trees from negative
to positive required more time than was allowed.
For a more in-depth discussion of how local conditions constrained the implementation of the8
organic standards, see Hatanaka 2010a.
Farmers were required to plant mangrove trees around their ponds with a maximum of seven9
meters between them.
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However, when I returned for my second field visit in 2008, the number of
member farmers had not declined, but increased. Although, as a result of their
audits, Green Soil was aware that many farmers were not in full compliance with
the mangrove reforestation standard, they did not revoke certification. Rather,
Green Soil warned PA that it needed to try to ensure full compliance with the
standards by member farmers. From the perspective of the PA officials I
interviewed, certification was not revoked because TPC had become increasingly
competitive and Green Soil did not want to lose a client to another certifier. Making
this point, one official with PA commented, “it turns out that we could negotiate
with Green Soil regarding their standards… I think this is because they need
certified projects to make profits. Without certificated farmers, there is no business
for them.” 
In short, the above findings indicate that for both PA and Green Soil,
organizational independence did not ensure the operational independence of their
audits. In both instances, the structure of the conformity-assessment process was
insufficient for ensuring the disinterestedness and impartiality of auditors.
Consequently, the practices of the auditors were not solely based on technical and
objective practices, but also entailed negotiation and compromises based on
personal and organizational interests.
Conformity Assessment and Standards Compliance 
In a third-party certified project, farmers are to implement standards, which are
monitored using a conformity-assessment process based primarily on audits. In this
way, TPC standardizes production practices and thus, removes farmers’ subjectivity
from farming. Put differently, TPC substitutes rules and objective monitoring
practices for local knowledge and trust. However, as audits largely check
documents, and practices only periodically, the efficacy of the conformity-
assessment process is dependent on documentation. In the organic shrimp project,
some farmers filled out the required documentation fraudulently. Such a finding
raises questions as to the effectiveness of the conformity-assessment process of
TPC. 
In interviews, some farmers in the organic shrimp project admitted that they
were not fully complying with the standard. Consequently, they said that they filled
in inaccurate information on the required documentation forms to stay in the
project. According to them, this was possible as the audit process was often unable
to detect noncompliance. For example, one farmer commented, “inspectors don’t
come to the pond everyday. They come only sometimes. Besides, they always
12
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believe whatever we report them. It’s so easy to cheat them. When they ask ‘did you
use chemicals?’ all we have to do is to say ‘no.’” In short, as some farmers found the
standards or parts of them to be inappropriate or not in their best interest, yet
wanted the economic benefits the project offered, they partook in fraud.
Those member farmers who filled in inaccurate information often justified their
actions by explaining that the standards were imposed on them, and that the
standards were not always appropriate. Furthermore, even if they voiced their
concerns, no changes were made in the standard. Rather, they were simply told to
leave the project if they were unhappy with how the project operated. Consequently,
many farmers felt that they had to change the farming practices, which they had
long used and were effective, to practices specified by outsiders. Reflecting on the
situation, one farmer commented that, “It does not mean that we want to lie, but we
have no choice. They force us to do this.” 
In the six years in which the shrimp project was certified organic, PA detected
fraud several times. Sometimes they could uncover inconsistency in documentation,
and sometimes other farmers reported cases of noncompliance by particular farmers.
As they found cases of noncompliance, PA made changes to its ICS and audits to try
to increase their effectiveness. For example, they added additional checks (i.e.,
increased the number of inspections and documentation requirements).
Nevertheless, despite the changes, noncompliance did not disappear. As one farmer
commented in an interview, “[PA] is getting smarter and smarter. It is increasingly
becoming difficult to deceive them. However, we still can cheat them… No matter
how perfect the regulatory mechanism appears to be, there is always a way to sneak
out… Every system has a hole.” Therefore, despite changes instituted to make the
conformity-assessment process more stringent, it was not able to ensure farmers’
full conformity to the standards. 
In sum, many farmers saw project managers as seeking to control farming
practices in a top-down manner. Put differently, they felt that they had become
“standards-takers.” Thus, falsifying documentation functioned as “weapons of the
weak” for farmers (Scott 1985). That is, from the perspective of many farmers, by
not complying with the standards they were not cheating per se, but exercising
their limited power. Thus, the impartial and technical rules-based conformity-
assessment process did not remove farmers’ subjectivity regarding how to farm
shrimp. Rather, it pushed farmers to maneuver around the rules covertly.
Furthermore, while rules and audits are designed to substitute for trust, my
findings suggest that for rules and audits to function effectively, they are partly
dependent on the existence of relations of trust. In other words, the above findings
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raise questions as to the effectiveness of impartial and technical rules and audits in
instances where there is little trust. 
CONCLUSION
Building on Busch’s argument in The Eclipse of Morality (2000), this paper has
empirically examined the ways in which the governance of food and agriculture has
become increasingly scientized through third-party certification (TPC). As
discussed above, TPC is based on, and legitimated by, the notion of “mechanical
objectivity.” That is, the processes of standards development and conformity
assessment consist of clearly defined rules and procedures that are based on
scientific practices and norms (i.e., objectivity, impartiality, technicality, etc.). As
Porter (1995) argued, such rules and procedures function to eliminate politics and
interests.
In the organic shrimp project, however, the rules and procedures did not result
in TPC functioning as an objective governance mechanism. Put differently,
mechanical objectivity was not sufficient for eliminating politics and interests from
either the standards-development or the conformity-assessment process. First,
while the rules-based standards-development process limited the use of non-expert
knowledge, it did not eliminate politics. Rather, politics were grounded in expert
knowledge in that expert knowledge that represented specific interests was used in
the standards-development process. Second, the rules were not able to ensure the
operational independence of audits. Specifically, personal and organizational
interests influenced the audit process, despite rules and procedures designed to
eliminate them. Third, whereas rules and objective monitoring practices are meant
to substitute for farmers’ subjectivity and trust, the conformity-assessment process
was unable to do so. Consequently, it could not ensure farmers’ compliance with the
standards. Thus, my findings indicate that the rule-based character of TPC may not
always remove politics and interests from governance. Rather, at least in the
organic shrimp project, rule-based governance masks politics and interests with its
claims to objective and scientific practices. In particular, such forms of governance
push politics and interests backstage. 
While the above findings are based on a single case, they raise important
questions regarding the science-based governance of food and agriculture.
Specifically, what are the implications of a governance system where the governance
of food and agriculture is separated from those who produce and consume them?
Increasingly, producers must adhere to specific standards (e.g., organic, sustainable,
and fair trade), which are developed by experts using rule-based scientific processes.
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Simultaneously, consumers make choices about what food to eat partly based on
labels, which are based on standards. However, as my findings indicate, producers
may not comprehend why and how the particular standards were developed and
why they have to comply with them. Similarly, consumers may understand the
meaning of labels, but have little knowledge about how food is produced. In short,
neither producers nor consumers have much voice in the determination of what
organic, sustainable, and other quality attributes entail. 
Thus, in increasingly relying on “experts” and “professionals” (e.g., third-party
certifiers), producers and consumers are abdicating their rights and responsibility
in the governance of food and agriculture. For example, producers are losing
control over the production process and consumers are relying more on private
bodies to inform them about food and agriculture. Abdicating governance to private
bodies opens opportunities for such bodies to incorporate their interests into the
governance of food and agriculture (e.g., economic interests and social movement
objectives). It needs to be noted that these interests may or may not further the
public good. As the politics of governance increasingly take place backstage, this
means that the ways that standards reflect specific interests may not be readily
apparent on the front stage. Furthermore, the separation of governance from
producers and consumers, and its private character, may be further exacerbated by
the globalization of supply chains, as producers and consumers are increasingly
disconnected. Thus, I contend that the outcome is potentially a political, yet
undemocratic, form of food and agricultural governance, where science and rules
are used to mask politics. 
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